Indochina - Views of the United States on the Eve of the Geneva Conference: Address by the Secretary of State, March 29, 1954 (1)
... Their independence is not yet complete. But the French Government last July (4) declared its intention to complete that independence, and negotiations to consummate that pledge are actively under way.
The United States is watching this development with close attention and great sympathy. We do not forget that we were a colony that won its freedom. We have sponsored in the Philippines a conspicuously successful development of political independence. We feel a sense of kinship with those everywhere who yearn for freedom.
... The [communist] scheme is to whip up the spirit of nationalism so that it becomes violent. That is done by professional agitators. Then the violence is enlarged by Communist military and technical leadership and the provision of military supplies. In these ways, international Communism gets a strangle-hold on the people and it uses that power to "amalgamate" the peoples into the Soviet orbit.
"Amalgamation" is Lenin's and Stalin's word to describe their process.
"Amalgamation" is now being attempted in Indochina under the ostensible leadership of Ho Chi Minh. ...
Those fighting under the banner of Ho Chi Minh have largely been trained and equipped in Communist China. They are supplied with artillery and ammunition through the Soviet-Chinese Communist bloc. Captured material shows that much of it was fabricated by the Skoda Munition Works in Czechoslovakia and transported across Russia and Siberia and then sent through China into Vietnam. Military supplies for the Communist armies have been pouring into Vietnam at a steadily increasing rate.
Military and technical guidance is supplied by an estimated 2,000 Communist Chinese...
In the present stage, the Communists in Indochina use nationalistic anti-French slogans to win local support. But if they achieved military or political success, it is certain that they would subject the People to a cruel Communist dictatorship taking its orders from Peiping and Moscow.
...The tragedy would not stop there. If the Communist forces won uncontested control over Indochina or any substantial part thereof, they would surely resume the same pattern of aggression against other free peoples in the area.
The propagandists of Red China and Russia make it apparent that the purpose is to dominate all of Southeast Asia.
Southeast Asia is the so-called "rice bowl" which helps to feed the densely populated region that extends from India to Japan. It is rich in many raw materials, such as tin, oil, rubber and iron ore. It offers industrial Japan potentially important markets and sources of raw materials.
The area has great strategic value. Southeast Asia is astride the most direct and best developed sea and air routes between the Pacific and South Asia. It has major naval and air bases. Communist control of Southeast Asia would carry a grave threat to the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, with whom we have treaties of mutual assistance.(6) The entire Western Pacific area, including the so-called "offshore island chain", would be strategically endangered.
President Eisenhower appraised the situation last Wednesday when he said that the area is of "transcendent importance".(7)
The United States Position
The United States has shown in many ways its sympathy for the gallant struggle being waged in Indochina by French forces and those of the Associated States. Congress has enabled us to provide material aid to the established governments and their peoples. Also, our diplomacy has sought to deter Communist China from open aggression in that area.
President Eisenhower, in his address of April 16, 1953,(8) explained that a Korean armistice would be a fraud if it merely released aggressive armies for attack elsewhere. I said last September that if Red China sent its own army into Indochina, that would result in grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina.(9)
Recent statements have been designed to impress upon potential aggressors that aggression might lead to action at places and by means of free world choosing, so that aggression would cost more than it could gain.(10)
The Chinese Communists have, in fact, avoided the direct use of their own Red armies in open aggression against Indochina. They have, however, largely stepped up their support of the aggression in that area. Indeed, they promote that aggression by all means short of open invasion.
Under all the circumstances it seems desirable to clarify further the United States position.
Under the conditions of today, the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole free community. The United States feels that that possibility should not be passively accepted, but should be met by united action. This might involve serious risks. But these risks are far less than those that will face us a few years from now, if we dare not be resolute today.
... It is now the policy of the United States not to exchange United States performance for Communist promises.
That United States position was made clear at the recent Berlin Conference. There, by standing firm, I finally obtained the reluctant agreement by Mr. Molotov that the Geneva Conference (20) would not be a "Big Five Conference" and that the invitation to Geneva would itself specify that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, that conference should be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition where it had not already been accorded.(21)
The Chinese Communist regime has been invited only to discuss Korea and Indochina, where it is in fact a force of aggression which we cannot ignore. It gets no diplomatic recognition from us by the fact of its presence at Geneva. I said at Berlin: "It . . . is one thing to recognize evil as a fact. It is another thing to take evil to one's breast and call it good." (22) That we shall not do.
... Today the free world also feels a sense of lull. The danger of general war seems to have receded. I hope that that is so. If it is so, it is because the free nations saw the danger and moved unitedly, with courage and decision, to meet it.
There is, however, no reason for assuming that the danger has permanently passed. There is nothing to prove that the Soviet Communist rulers accepted peace as permanent, if permanent peace would block their ambitions. They continue unceasingly to burrow and tunnel to advance their positions against the citadels of freedom.
... As against such efforts, there is only one defense - eternal vigilance, sound policies and high courage.
Source:
American Foreign Policy 1950-1955
Basic Documents Volumes I and II
Department of State Publication 6446
General Foreign Policy Series 117
Washington, DC : U.S. Governemnt Printing Office, 1957
USMARC Cataloging Record