I just played WC4 and Maniac calls Orlando a depot in the communication he sends you before you get to shoot him down and after Seether takes out Orlando, Maniac refers to Bluepoint as a station (the '3,000 people aboard that crate and he just...just...' comm).
t.c.cgi said:The philosophy behind the Maginot Line wasn't wrong. If it was, the Germans wouldn't have used it themselves.
Sonntag said:It is right that Germany built the Westwall, as well, but this was more for propaganda than for military reasons.
t.c.cgi said:I was talking about the Atlantic Wall, actually. That whole thing the Allies put so much time and energy into creating and executing a plan to breach it.
Bandit LOAF said:Yeah, it's the same 3D model for both (in the cinematics and in the game). The script refers to it as a depot:
"Blair must now fly to the Blue Point depot and request clearance to land there."
"midgame: blue point depot (nephele system)"
It also has an alternate version for the line you just quoted: "Well, we've got no choice, buddy. Nearest depot is Blue Point. We can grab a shuttle to HQ there."
Sonntag said:Ok, I misunderstood that. Certainly the Atlantic Wall forced the allies to plan the invasion strongly, but I think also this wall shows how useless static defenses are (there are exceptions of this rule, of course). It didn't take the Allies long to leave the beaches, strong resistance from the Germans came later, like in the Ardennes, so also here the static defenses were not even close as effective as the army.
Quarto said:Take note, during that half a year, a huge portion of France's fighter squadrons shifted from obsolescent junk to fighters planes equal or better than Germany's own (sadly, the same thing cannot be said for the pilots ).
The Dewoitine D.520 was more or less equal to the Bf 109E-3 - the latter was about 20km faster, but the Dewoitine was more manoeuvrable. Firepower was also fairly equal - the Bf 109 had two 20mm cannons and two 7.9mm machine guns, while the Dewoitine admittedly only had one 20mm cannon, but had four 7.5mm machine guns.Primate said:Correct me if I'm wrong (and forgive me for nitpicking), but I recall that France's airforce was never up to par with Germany's. Because they waited too long to prepare they were way behind in aircraft technology. Their best homemade planes (arguably) such as the Dewoitine (sp?) .500 were at least slower, less powerful and less heavily armed, and were no match on paper for a messerchmidt et. al.
Indeed, the FW 190 was far, far superior to the Dewoitine and other French planes... which is probably because the FW 190 first entered service in 1941, a full year after France had fallen.Farbourne said:I'm pretty sure that the only Allied production warplane that used fuel injection in 1940 was the Spitfire (and maybe the Hurricane), which weren't available in the same numbers as the fuel injected Bf-109's and the FW-190's that Germany had in large numbers. Nothing the French had was comparable.
According to Heinz Guderian, French tanks were better than what the Germans had - and I'm pretty sure he knew more about the subject than you ever will . Tactics, of course, is another issue entirely.And neither the French nor the British had anything that came close to a Panzer III, nor any tactics that matched up to the massed armor squadron techniques that the Germans used. French armor tactics dictated dividing tanks up in ones and twos among their infantry units, which of course completely eliminates their mobility advantages.
Again, you're completely missing the point. Because of the Maginot line, the Germans had to gamble an armoured attack through a hilly, densely-wooded region. You do realise that about the only thing worse for them would have been a swamp, right? It doesn't matter that they won - the point is, it was far harder for them to win this way than it would have been otherwise.An enemy taking the offesnive knows (hopefully, or he shoulnd't be attacking) where what defenses are, and will of course choose the most vulnerable point. In 1940 the Germans, knowing that attacking the Maginot line would be dumb, attacked where there wasn't a defense.
Quarto said:The Dewoitine D.520...
Quarto said:Indeed, the FW 190 was far, far superior to the Dewoitine and other French planes... which is probably because the FW 190 first entered service in 1941, a full year after France had fallen.
Quarto said:According to Heinz Guderian, French tanks were better than what the Germans had - and I'm pretty sure he knew more about the subject than you ever will . Tactics, of course, is another issue entirely.
Quarto said:Again, you're completely missing the point. Because of the Maginot line, the Germans had to gamble an armoured attack through a hilly, densely-wooded region. You do realise that about the only thing worse for them would have been a swamp, right? It doesn't matter that they won - the point is, it was far harder for them to win this way than it would have been otherwise.
Quarto said:One thing is worth highlighting - the people making these decisions were not stupid. In fact, they knew more about this subject than you ever will. They based their decisions on careful analysis of dozens of factors - most of which you and I aren't even aware of. You can't just stroll in and declare that it was stupid to build the Maginot Line or any other such defences - all you achieve that way is to make a fool of yourself by claiming to know more than the people who devoted their whole lives to the subject in question.
Farbourne said:I'm pretty sure that the only Allied production warplane that used fuel injection in 1940 was the Spitfire (and maybe the Hurricane)
I don't think I was really being offensive - I used mildly sharp arguments, but certainly not anything that wouldn't be acceptable in a real debate (heck, probably even in a high school debate).Farbourne said:Well, it appears that I spoke out of turn. You have some good points (I had made the mistake of listening to conventional wisdom rather than researching some of the points myself). Still, there's no reason to be offensive. The main points that I was putting forward, relevant to the thread question regarding standing defenses, are valid.
Ah, yes, but my point was that without the Maginot Line, Germany would have possibly been able to attack in October 1939, when France had no D.520s whatsoever. The Maginot Line, by forcing the Germans to prepare for a far more complicated scenario, ultimately meant that bad weather was enough to delay the attack until 1940 - because driving a tank along a muddy road is one thing, and driving it through a muddy forest is another thing entirely.True, but there were only 79 D.520's in service when Germany attacked, a small number compared to the resources of the Luftwaffe. Not enough to establish air superiority. This is one point where additional resources not spent building fixed defenses may have been useful.
I wasn't trying to be insulting... well, ok, yes, I was - but also I'll happily admit that Heinz Guderian knew more about the topic than I ever will .Again, no reason to be insulting. And yes, some French tanks may have been better, and the French did have more tanks than the Germans, but many of the French tanks were outmoded WW1 era models. As you mentioned, tactics were the key problem, but wouldn't some more aggressive war-games and training have revealed some of the tactical problems? Another point when additional resources would have helped.
...And that's exactly what the French wanted.How am I missing the point? My point was that the reason the Maginot line never saw action was that it was the strongest defensive point and therefore avoided.
Because building defences is more than a matter of resources. It's also politics. Had France built defences on the Belgian border, they would effectively been saying that in the event of war, they have no intention of helping the Belgians. I imagine that more than a few Belgians would, in that situation, suggest that an alliance with Germany might not be a bad idea. After all, the only reason they ever got attacked in WWI and WWII was because the Germans needed to get to France. So if the French aren't going to help you deal with passing Germans, then it may be best to let the Germans pass through. On the other hand, as long as the Franco-Belgian border was not fortified, the Belgians were French allies by default.Hilly, densey-wooded regions are easy to build defenses in, so why didn't the French use a fraction of the money and effor they spent on the Maginot line to fortify the other parts of their boundary?
I think you're confusing the French public and the French command. Yes, the French public had a false sense of security thanks to the Maginot Line (...and I imagine this was another factor in building the Line - to give a war-weary nation a sense of security)... but the French command certainly didn't. The reason they fought defensively and lost in 1940 was precisely because the war came at the worst possible time for them. They knew they weren't prepared for it, and the best they could do was buy time to rearm.Worse, the Maginot line gave the illusion of security, which may have led to a false sense of security among the French command and accounted for some of their poor tactical response.
My point is that it's far, far too easy to criticise the defeated as being wrong. However, very often such mistakes were not mistakes at the time they were made - and similarly, in many cases such mistakes were simply the result of trying to do well in a bad situation. It's too easy to forget that what appears today as an obvious mistake may have been the result of someone knowingly choosing a bad option when the only other option available was even worse.Again, no reason to snipe. I agree that many of those minds were better versed in the subjects than you or I might be. And I don't believe that I ever said they were stupid--just that some of their decisions were mistakes. But it's silly to say "these people knew more, so who are we to question them. They must have been right". These people who knew so much decided that tanks were best used in infantry support. Similar people decided that battleships were far more valuable than carriers, and that torpedoes could never be used in so shallow a place as Pearl Harbor.
Regarding static defenses: The point is that they are not an efficient use of resources.
The advantage in being a defender is that you will, pound for pound, inflict greater casualities than you will recieve, and more so if the battle takes place where the static defenses are. The battle of Gettysburg was won by the Union largely because they were fighting on defensively favorable ground, further enhanced by static (but cheap and hastily erected) defenses.